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Abstract
Anglo-American journalism has typically drawn a firm dividing line between those who report the news and those who
run the business of news. This boundary, often referred to in the West as a ‘Chinese Wall’, is designed to uphold the inde-
pendence of journalists from commercial interests or the whims of news proprietors. But does this separation still exist in
today’s age of social media and at a time when news revenues are under unprecedented pressure? This article focuses on
Twitter, now awidely used tool in the newsroom, analysing the Twitter output of 10 UK political correspondents during the
busy party conference season. It examines how they promote their own stories or ‘personal brand’ and whether they are
stepping over a once forbidden line, blurring the boundary between news and the business. The research is complemented
by interviews with political correspondents and analysis of editorial codes of practice on the use of social media. It draws
on a conceptual framework of boundary work (Carlson & Lewis, 2015) to pose the question whether such practice has
now become accepted and normalised. The findings suggest that the 10 political correspondents are highly individualistic
in their use of Twitter but all have embraced its use to promote their own work plus that of colleagues both inside their
own organisation and those working for rival news outlets. Their acceptance of Twitter as a tool for self-promotion and
branding suggests that in this area of reporting the practice has become normalised and the wall has been breached.
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1. Introduction
Back in the old days of journalism, in the era before so-
cial media when newspapers enjoyed rich earnings, few
reporters would spend time thinking about profitability
or their employer’s business. As Alan Rusbridger, the for-
mer editor of The Guardian, remarked in his autobiog-
raphy (2018), there was simply no need to talk about
business models when he started out in the mid-1970s.
TheAnglo-American norms of journalism that evolved on
both sides of the Atlantic in the late 19th century were
still intact and prescribed a strict separation between
news and the business of news. The goal was very sim-
ple: to uphold the editorial integrity of independent jour-
nalism, untarnished by considerations of advertising rev-
enues, the bottom line or the personal whims of news
proprietors. In the jargon of the newsroom, this bound-
ary was called a ‘Chinese Wall.’
Throughout North America, Europe and many other
parts of the world, that separation held good for more
than a century as a fundamental norm of journalism
(Cornia, Sehl, & Nielsen, 2018, p. 20). But does it still ex-
ist today when many news organisations are struggling
to survive and adapt to the sweeping changes wrought
by social media? This article explores one specific part
of the equation, namely the use of Twitter which has
rapidly become a ubiquitous tool in the newsroom. It
examines the Twitter output of 10 seasoned UK politi-
cal correspondents during the annual party conference
season in September 2018, a time of frantic political ac-
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tivity and infighting as Britain entered the final stages
of negotiations to exit the European Union, commonly
known as ‘Brexit’. The analysis is complemented by in-
terviews with political journalists and an examination of
their news organisations’ codes of practice on the use
of social media. Previous research has focused on the
way journalistic norms are evolving in this period of dis-
ruption when pressures of the market become stronger
(Hanusch & Tandoc, 2017, p. 4). Several studies have ex-
plored journalists’ use of social media to brand them-
selves and their organisations (Barthel, Moon, & Mari,
2015; Brems, Temmerman, Graham, & Broersma, 2017;
Lough, Molyneux, & Holton, 2017; Molyneux, 2015;
Molyneux & Holton, 2015; Molyneux, Holton, & Lewis,
2018) while others have focused on the ways journalists
present their personal and professional identities online
(Bossio & Sacco, 2017; Olausson, 2017). But few have di-
rectly addressed the issue of the Chinese Wall, journal-
ists’ perceptions of whether this norm is under attack
and what they feel about it today. How do the political
journalists, working in the ‘lobby’ system of parliament
at Westminster, promote their own stories or those of
their respective news organisations at a time when audi-
ence engagement is increasingly important? Do they feel
that they are stepping over a forbidden line and blurring
the boundary between news and the business? Or is it
now viewed as an acceptable practice? The article draws
on a conceptual framework of boundary work (Carlson
& Lewis, 2015) and seeks to contribute to the debate
about how what it means to be a journalist is being re-
defined. The results of the research suggest that the 10
political correspondents, although all covering the same
story, are highly individualistic in their use of Twitter as a
branding tool. All have embraced its use to promote their
own work plus that of colleagues and those working for
rival news outlets. The acceptance of Twitter as a tool for
self-promotion and branding by senior journalists who
are by no means ‘digital natives’ suggests that in this nar-
row field of British reporting the practice has become
normalised and the wall has been quietly breached.
2. How Separation Became the Norm
Many professions erect boundaries around their activity
to protect themselves from intruders and journalism is
no exception. But unlike, for example, Law or Medicine,
Journalism does not require exams or membership of
an industry association. Instead, the boundaries are de-
fined through practice, discourse and values, with jour-
nalists engaging in ‘boundary work’ to cultivate a distinct
logic that sets them apart from other fields (Waisbord,
2013, p. 10). The concept stems from the U.S. sociol-
ogist Thomas Gieryn (1983) and has recently gained a
foothold in Journalism Studies in the light of the decline
of legacy media outlets and the rise of social media (Carl-
son & Lewis, 2015). The emergence and growth of new
media forms throughout the 20th century repeatedly
generated defensive responses, couched in normative
terms loosely grouped under the term ‘objectivity’, from
many of the established practitioners of the day (Singer,
2015, p. 23).
One of the key tenets of that consensual occupa-
tional ideology is journalistic independence or autonomy.
For Coddington, the separation of the business of news
fromnews itself is so fundamental that it is simply known
as ‘the wall’ (2015, p. 67). And as long as newspapers
prospered, journalists were able to believe that they had
succeeded in building a wall between ‘church and state’
(2015, p. 70). This often manifested itself through phys-
ical separation: the newsroom and business sides of a
newspaper were on separate floors. But today, ‘native
advertising’ has become a regular feature of the media
landscape. Critics call such content advertising wearing
the uniform of journalism (Coddington, 2015, p. 76). But
as Richards observes, while the journalist may be the es-
sential unit of ethical agency, he or she does not oper-
ate in a vacuum—many are employees of large corpora-
tions, the primary aim of which is to maximise the return
to shareholders (2004, p. 119). In other words, journal-
ists are now feeling the pressure of participating in the
market for audience clicks and adopting the role of mar-
keter (Tandoc & Vos, 2016, p. 960). This poses the ques-
tionwhether the ‘wall’ is ripe for renegotiation (Artemas,
Vos, & Duffy, 2018, p. 1004). As more and more journal-
ists set out on their own, orwork for start-ups, theymight
wear multiple hats, producing content but also being a
marketer, advertising executive and business manager
(Singer, 2015, p. 30). Cornia et al. argue that both editors
and managers are working to foster a cultural change to
ensure commercial sustainability (2018, p. 2).
3. Twitter—Not Just a News Gathering Tool
Oneof the catalysts for the challenging of boundaries has
been Twitter. It now has 335 million active users world-
wide; within the UK, there are 13 million users while
some 500 million tweets are sent each day worldwide.
Since its launch in 2006, Twitter has become the most
widely used social media tool by journalists (Parmelee,
2013), developing into an essential mechanism for the
distribution of breaking news and as a tool to solicit story
ideas, sources and facts (Hermida, 2010, p. 299). In fact,
it has taken on the character of a convenient, cheap
and effective ‘beat’ for journalists, offering a large range
of sources who would otherwise be hard to approach
(Broersma & Graham, 2013, p. 447). This is essential in
an environment in which newsgathering resources have
often been cut and in which reporters are expected to
write more stories (Broersma&Graham, 2013). Hermida
calls Twitter an ‘awareness system’ that can alert jour-
nalists to breaking news and trends (2010, p. 304). At
the same time, news organisations have adopted Twitter
as a means of distributing short, rapid updates on news
they are producing and, sometimes, on that from third
parties. This has led to fears that tweets are being indis-
criminately incorporated into stories without fact check-
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ing. Failure to contact the person tweeting erodes jour-
nalism as a practice of verification (Broersma & Graham,
2013, p. 461).
It is also now common for journalists to leverage such
tools to show a human face to their audience or read-
ers, especially in the online environment (Barnard, 2016,
p. 198). As a result, research has focused on how roles,
values and norms are evolving (Bossio & Sacco, 2017).
A consistent theme is the incorporation of journalists’
own opinion in tweets, at odds with the classic definition
of objectivity. In her study of two London-based journal-
ists using Twitter to disseminate breaking news on inner-
city rioting in 2011, Vis concluded that more than one
fifth of the tweets sent by a New York Times journalist
contained his own opinion (2013, p. 42). Equally, Brems
et al. found that a sample of Dutch and Flemish jour-
nalists were quite willing to voice their own opinion on
Twitter (2017, p. 452). The use of retweets additionally
provides an opportunity for journalists to pass on opin-
ions without the threat to their objectivity if they stated
the same words themselves (Molyneux, 2015, p. 928).
Twitter also sits uneasily with another norm, the tradi-
tional detachment from journalists’ sources and the audi-
ence (Molyneux, 2015, p. 922). But all this comes at a time
when newsrooms are recognising an increasing need to
engagewith their audiences andbe responsive to commu-
nities (Mayer, 2011). This, Mayer adds, means journalists
have to build connections and personalise their brand.
In the light of such overt challenges established news
organisations have updated internal editorial guidelines
to incorporate social media. Duffy and Knight analysed
codes at 17 news organisations and found the use of so-
cial media was generally embraced but with the caution-
ary message that it was also risky (2018, p. 8). Codes dif-
fered in the crucial area of the journalist’s identity. The
majority, 11 out of 17, made it clear the news organi-
sation expected the professional identity to take prece-
dence over, even subsume, any personal identity. Others
required journalists to keep these personae separate and
avoid any blurring of lines. Such codes of conduct have
not always found favour among journalists. A study of
Flemish journalists showed that some considered codes
a curtailment of individual freedom and resisted a re-
quirement to use only one Twitter account (Opgenhaf-
fen & Scheerlinck, 2014, p. 726). Some guidelines tended
to treat Twitter as a branding and promotional opportu-
nity (Bloom, Cleary, & North, 2016, p. 352); a study of
news managers at U.S. network affiliate television sta-
tions found they also viewed Twitter as a valuable pro-
motional tool (Lysak, Cremedas, & Wolf, 2012, p. 203).
It is widely recognised that social media allow individ-
uals to construct and re-imagine the self (Siapera, 2018),
a concept that has been called ‘presencing’ or ‘sustain-
ing a public presence’ (Couldry, 2012). When it comes to
journalists, Barthel et al. argue that Twitter provides an
ideal platform to gain visibility, credibility and prestige
(2015, p. 2). This enables them to increase their market
value or, in the case of freelancers, advertise their skills
(Brems et al., 2017, p. 445). Some specialised groups
of journalists such as health reporters have been par-
ticularly active in developing a digital identity as ‘early
adopters’ (Molyneux & Holton, 2015, p. 226). Molyneux
et al. argue that journalists engage in three levels of
‘branding’1 through their use of Twitter: promoting the
self, their employer’s news organisation and the insti-
tution of journalism at large (2018, p. 1386). As a re-
sult, journalistic branding is a product of several pres-
sures that journalists, their organisation and their occu-
pation are facing (Molyneux et. al, 2018, p. 1391). Their
study of U.S. journalists found that 58% of their tweets
included elements of branding. Some studies based on
interviews with journalists have also highlighted journal-
ists’ concerns about a growing emphasis by employers
on personal branding (Chadha & Wells, 2016, p. 1028).
While they recognised the value in raising their profile
and status in a newsroom, they expressed reservations
that a personal brand could outstrip that of the news
organisation, running counter to the normative ideology
discouraging the development of a journalist’s individual
public persona (Chadha&Wells, 2016, p. 1029). Similarly,
Sacco and Bossio identified in their study of Australian
newsrooms a culture clash between traditional journalis-
tic values and management attempts to integrate social
media (2017, p. 187).
Political journalists enjoy a unique position as a me-
diator of power in the relationship between politicians
and the public and depend on trust and credibility (Ot-
tovordemgentschenfelde, 2017, p. 68). They often work
on a narrowly focused beat and in a bounded space
outside the main newsroom, for example in the House
of Commons ‘lobby’. Such environments are known for
their intense, close-knit journalistic communities with
the ability to engage in off-the-record conversations with
politicians. A study of reporters working in the State
Capitol Building in Albany, New York, found the use
of Twitter generated intense news-breaking pressure
(Revers, 2015, p. 8). One reporter called it a “huge class-
room” where everyone was able to monitor everyone
else (Revers, 2015). An analysis of tweets during the
2016U.S. election by political correspondents found they
tended to interact mostly with each other, banding to-
gether as a community to shore up a profession they see
as under threat (Molyneux & Mourão, 2017, p. 15). The
close-knit nature of political reporting suggests that such
reporters tend to retweet others who are working in the
same arena. Barthel et al. found that ‘traditional’ jour-
nalists overwhelmingly retweeted those from other tra-
ditional news organisations and rarely ones working in
the digital-only sector (2015, p. 13).
4. Research Questions and Methodology
This study seeks to make a contribution to the under-
standing of how one group of political journalists in the
1 Branding is understood as the action of differentiating an individual, entity or product from others (Murphy, 1987).
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UKuses Twitter as ameans of branding andwhether they
feel there are tensions with the norm of separation be-
tween their news reporting and the business of news. In
such a context, it is important to explore how journalists
are changing practice alongside how they conceive their
role (Tandoc & Vos, 2016, p. 954). The study thus seeks
to construct a holistic picture of their branding activity
and addresses three interlinked research questions:
RQ1: HowdoUK political correspondents brand them-
selves, their news organisation or the profession of
journalism through their use of Twitter?
RQ2: What guidelines are political correspondents
subject to from their employers when they use social
media tools such as Twitter?
RQ3: Do UK political correspondents feel their activity
is consistent with the traditional norm of separation
between news and the business of news?
The study is based on a quantitative and qualitative ana-
lysis of the Twitter activity of 10 top UK political cor-
respondents in September 2018 and the first days of
October. This is supplemented by an analysis of their
Twitter profiles, codes of practice and semi-structured
interviews. This was a time of turmoil in British politics,
with Brexit negotiations at a critical stage. September is
also the conference seasonwhen themain parties gather
to debate their policy agendas. The period of 33 days
covers the time from the end of the summer break un-
til the final day of the Conservative Party conference on
October 3.
These correspondents are part of what in the UK
is known as the lobby system. Their accreditation gives
them special access to daily briefings by the govern-
ment’s spokesmanand to theHouses of Parliament, a sys-
tem in place since the 1870s. Today, it is still a closed envi-
ronment in which reporters work closely alongside each
other and politicians. Twitter is deeply embedded in that
culture and has been attacked by Guardian journalist
Rafael Behr for distorting and corrupting the political pro-
cess (2018). Behr considers Twitter to be ideally suited
to the political hothouse of Westminster and while indi-
vidual journalists are looking for their own scoop, there
are times when they operate as a ‘pack’ (2018, p. 22):
“Journalists and commentators ‘follow’ each other, gath-
ering at the virtual water cooler. This exacerbates the
tendency to form cartels of information.”
The 10 journalists were selected in order to obtain a
cross section of lobby reporting from broadcasters and
print media. Each had an active Twitter feed and was
covering the main political and Brexit story dominating
British headlines. Most of those chosen were the news
organisation’s senior political reporter, some of them
household names on evening television news bulletins.
Threewere chosen from the BBC given the organisation’s
blanket coverage of Westminster, plus the chief politi-
cal correspondent of each of the other three main news
broadcasters—ITV, Sky and Channel 4. In addition, the
lead political correspondents from four daily newspapers
were chosen, ensuring a broad spectrum in terms of po-
litical outlook and editorial stance on Brexit. The broad-
casters were Laura Kuenssberg, John Pienaar and Chris
Mason of the BBC, Robert Peston, ITV, Faisal Islam, Sky,
and Gary Gibbon, Channel 4. The newspaper journalists
were: Heather Stewart of The Guardian, Francis Elliott,
The Times, Gordon Rayner, The Telegraph, and Jason
Groves, The Daily Mail.
All their tweets from September 1 to October 3 were
captured to conduct the content analysis which included
a quantitative assessment of their output and a qualita-
tive analysis of their actual tweets and retweets. A code-
bookwas createdwhich drew on the categorisation used
by Molyneux et al. (2018). It collated the total number
of tweets and retweets during the period for each jour-
nalist and two sets of data. The first focused on the
nature of the tweet or retweet—whether the subject
matter was political or events outside Westminster, e.g.,
references to sport, humour, entertainment, etc. The
second categorised tweets and retweets for branding—
elements of individual branding (referring to or promot-
ing the journalist’s own work), elements of organisa-
tional branding (referring to or promoting the work of
a colleague), and institutional branding (referring to or
promoting the work of journalists at another news out-
let or an issue about journalism). The first category did
not include tweets where correspondents were report-
ing breaking news in snippets, often the case during con-
ference speeches.
This breakdown was supplemented by an analysis of
the correspondent’s Twitter profile and their organisa-
tion’s code on the use of social media. The analysis of the
Twitter profile focused on whether the journalist stated
his or her affiliation, the actual Twitter ‘handle’ (whether
it contained the news organisation or not), whether
there was any form of disclaimer about personal opin-
ion offered andwhether additional personal information
was given beyond the reporter’s ‘beat’. The disclaimer
is particularly relevant in connection with retweets and
any public perception that retweeting information im-
plies endorsement of that person’s views, or, in the case
of politicians, their party’s views. Editorial guidelines for
six of the eight news organisations were publicly avail-
able through their websites2.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted during
the same time period with seven broadcast and newspa-
per journalists about their Twitter activity and their views
on editorial policy. These were conducted in person or
over the phone and for pragmatic reasons of availability
included some journalists outside the group of 10 whose
Tweets were analysed. All the journalists were, however,
closely involved in covering the Westminster story. Crit-
ically, all were senior and had been working as journal-
2 These were: the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Sky, The Guardian and The Telegraph. The Times refers to the Editors’ Code of Practice as drawn up by the
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO).
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ists well before the introduction of Twitter in 2006 or
other social media tools. The discussion of findings uses
the names of the 10 correspondents whose tweets were
tracked but the data and quotes from those interviewed
were anonymised.
5. Findings and Discussion
5.1. Lobby Correspondent Profiles
The starting point for how the lobby correspondents
brand themselves is their profile on Twitter. It is, by defini-
tion, a form of branding (Molyneux et al., 2018, p. 1395).
All 10 begin their profile with a designation of their
role and news affiliation (see Table 1). Two of the BBC
journalists, Laura Kuenssberg and Chris Mason, use the
BBC handle (e.g., @bbclaurak) in line with the organi-
sation’s guidelines, thus making it clear that tweets are
part of their work for the BBC and not a personal ac-
count. John Pienaar, the deputy political editor of BBC
News, uses @JPonpolitics, a handle that promotes his
weekly political podcast Pienaar’s Politics. Two of the
newspaper correspondents also use a formulation to
highlight their affiliation, The Guardian and The Times
(@GuardianHeather and @ElliottTimes). All three BBC
correspondents highlight their beat by featuring a pic-
ture of the Houses of Parliament or Big Ben in their pro-
file as does Channel 4’s Gary Gibbon and the Telegraph’s
Gordon Rayner. The banner picture on Kuenssberg’s pro-
file features a scrum of photographers with her standing
out in blue against the predominantly grey sea of the
others. ITV’s political editor uses a picture of his recently
published book on the current political climate, together
with a banner promoting it featuring a positive review
in the Financial Times “Richly argued and brilliantly writ-
ten.” With the exception of the BBC correspondents and
Channel 4’s Gary Gibbon, the others are casually dressed,
projecting an informal identity. By way of comparison,
Lough et al. analysed the Twitter profiles of 384 jour-
nalists in the United States and found that 67% were in
professional attire (2017 p. 1284).
Table 1. Twitter profiles.
Element in profile No/10
Name of employer and role 10
Employer name in Twitter handle 6
Picture of parliament 5
Professional attire 4
Disclaimer on views 2
Personal interests outside beat mentioned 5
Only two of the 10 use a disclaimer. Jason Groves of The
Daily Mail writes: “Views my own, I am afraid,” typical of
the self-deprecating humour often found in the group’s
tweets. Kuenssberg states: “Retweets not my own or
BBC’s view.” This clearly reflects an awareness of the in-
herent danger in retweeting in the political arena and
the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines (2018) on micro-blogging
which, in reference to Twitter, state: “When forward-
ing or ‘retweeting’ messages, care should be taken that
it does not appear that the BBC is endorsing a particu-
lar opinion.”
When it comes to personal interests, the BBC’s Chris
Mason mentions that he is a “Yorkshire Dalesman” (sev-
eral personal tweets revolve around Yorkshire) while
Robert Peston cites his support for the Arsenal football
team. In a similar vein, Gordon Rayner laments the poor
performance of the team he supports, calling himself a
“long-suffering” Newcastle United fan. In this way, these
journalists were blurring the line between their personal
and professional identity.
5.2. Editorial Guidelines
The editorial guidelines issued by the lobby correspon-
dents’ news organisations strike a consistent tone, tread-
ing a fine line between embracing the benefits of social
media and warning of potential pitfalls. Typical of this is
the BBC (2015):
Social media is now critical to our work, allowing us
to more easily connect with people….But social me-
dia easily blurs the line between the personal and pro-
fessional, and the simplest misstep could lead you to
undermine the credibility of yourself, your colleagues,
and BBC News as a whole.
The BBC makes it clear that the social media activity
of its editors, presenters and correspondents should be
viewed as ‘official,’ with the same status as their main-
stream TV, radio or digital output. At the same time, the
guidelines attempt to give correspondents scope to ex-
press themselves outside their ‘beat’, saying such dis-
cussion is actually encouraged (giving free rein to Chris
Mason to sing the praises of his native Yorkshire). “Social
media,” the BBC guidelines say, “is all about personality
and being human” (2015).
While these guidelines tread a narrow line, they
bring social media tools like Twitter within the norma-
tive framework of their editorial codes. This theme nec-
essarily runs through guidelines drawn up by all the news
broadcasters which are overseen by the regulator Ofcom.
Channel 4 News states that when a journalist is using
Twitter with a designated account, postings are subject
to Channel 4’s normal controls, such as standards of
due impartiality, editorial independence and accuracy
(2018). ITV guidelines specifically reference Ofcom; Sky’s
guidelines make clear that nothing should be tweeted or
retweeted that the broadcaster would not be prepared
to put on any of its platforms (2017). The lobby corre-
spondents’ respective newspapers show very little differ-
ence in attitude in this respect. The Telegraph states that
editorial independence must be maintained and must
not be influenced by commercial staff or the interests
of advertisers. But it also suggests a subtle shift, saying
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(2018): “It is entirely appropriate, and indeed essential,
that editorial staff understand and contribute to the com-
mercial success of the Telegraph.”
5.3. Twitter Activity
The level of the lobby correspondents’ Twitter activ-
ity varied widely but generally peaked as the Labour
and Conservative parties held their conferences. Many
of the correspondents were reporting—and tweeting—
live from the conferences in the cities of Brighton, Liv-
erpool and Birmingham, often uploading pictures of
the proceedings.
The raw data (see Table 2) show that themost prolific
‘tweeters’ were in equalmeasure the BBC’s Laura Kuenss-
berg and Chris Mason, both with around 440 tweets
and retweets during the September 1–October 3 pe-
riod, followed by The Guardian’s Heather Stewart with
a total 392. Almost all used Twitter as a means of per-
sonal branding, often promoting their own stories, tele-
vision shows or podcasts. In addition, they frequently
referred to work by their colleagues covering the same
field of Westminster politics, sometimes praising their
stories and sometimes promoting their news organisa-
tion directly. Occasionally, they would act in concert and
retweet and credit a scoop by one of their rivals in the
lobby. When Francis Elliott of The Times broke an ex-
clusive Brexit story, it was widely retweeted. The cor-
respondents’ personal branding took several different
forms: someused their posts to build up a picture of their
lives outside politics (Mason), others uploaded numer-
ous photographs of themselves (Peston), while others re-
stricted their activity almost entirely to their coverage of
the political story.
Kuenssberg has 831,000 Twitter followers and is one
of the best known BBC reporters. But earlier in the year,
shewas quoted as saying that shewas close to leaving so-
cial media because of the vitriol levelled at her (Thorpe,
2018). In a panel discussion about online abuse, she said:
The way that some online sites have given a mega-
phone to peoplewhowant to cause trouble, given the
oxygen for that kind of thing, has actually in away shut
it down, and that is a shame.
But as the conference season progressed, Kuenssberg
stepped up activity and promoted her own interviews
with senior politicians such as TheresaMay and hermain
challenger for the Conservative leadership Boris Johnson
(5.9% of her total tweets promoted directly her own in-
terviews or online stories) At times her rapid-fire tweet-
ing of live events was like that of a news agency. This was
accompanied by frequent retweets of BBC news stories
by colleagues, particularly those working in Europe on
Brexit. In this fashion, Kuenssberg was using her Twitter
feed as an additional online distribution channel for the
BBC. Rarely did she tweet on matters outside the realm
of politics.
Her BBC colleague Chris Mason was equally prolific
but showed amore diverse and humorous range of inter-
ests beyond the political scene, giving his 66,000 Twitter
followers a glimpse of his personal life. These ranged
from complaining about workmen outside his home at
8 a.m. on a Sunday morning to Yorkshire pudding and
crack-of-dawn starts. Mason used Twitter to promote
heavily the BBC’s ‘Brexitcast’ podcast, which he hosts
with two colleagues, plus his appearances on BBC Break-
fast television. He frequently cited his BBC colleagues,
sometimes retweeting their work and sometimes com-
menting on personal issues. A large number of tweets
were dedicated to a BBC colleague who had just died
of cancer, while other tweets were humorous, featur-
ing goldfish named after correspondents and the difficul-
ties of moving house. In contrast, the BBC’s John Pienaar
was far less diverse in his posts. He used his Twitter feed
predominantly to promote his ownprogrammePienaar’s
Politics. His tweets featured video live from outside loca-
tions or party conference venues and gave a run-down
of his guest line-up.
Table 2. Twitter activity.
Branding
(% of total tweets/retweets)
Non-political Self Colleague Other newsJournalist Followers Tweet Retweet Total tweets outlets
C Mason 66,000 264 178 442 31 52 11.8% 83 18.8% 10 2.3%
L Kuenssberg 831,000 300 141 441 2 26 5.9% 102 23.1% 20 4.5%
H Stewart 22,500 126 266 392 0 4 1.0% 120 30.6% 44 11.2%
F Islam 261,000 239 80 319 0 19 6.0% 82 25.7% 18 5.6%
R Peston 909,000 199 23 222 8 62 27.9% 0 — 17 7.7%
F Elliott 11,400 40 94 134 4 8 6.0% 24 17.9% 16 11.9%
J Groves 8,300 59 6 65 1 0 — 2 3.1% 27 41.5%
G Rayner 9,100 36 3 39 3 0 — 10 25.6% 4 10.3%
J Pienaar 66,000 32 4 36 0 31 86.1% 1 2.8% 0 —
G Gibbon 40,000 22 0 22 0 22 100% 0 — 0 —
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Kuenssberg’s chief broadcast rival is ITV’s Robert
Peston, a former colleague who shot to fame with a se-
ries of scoops for the BBC during the 2008 financial crisis.
Peston has 909,000 followers on Twitter and even a sepa-
rate account called ‘Robert Peston’s Hair’ (only 1,311 fol-
lowers), emphasising the cult of personality around him.
He routinely commented on the news, injecting his own
opinion. In one tweet, he said: “Our economy has failed
in its fundamental purpose of giving hope of a better life
for most of us.” He used his feed to hit back at critics who
accused him of attacking the Labour Party leader Jeremy
Corbyn after a summer in which the politician became
embroiled in a bitter anti-Semitism row. When it came
to analysing politics, Peston skirted the character limit on
Twitter by posing a political question and then linking to
a longer comment piece hosted on Facebook. He lever-
aged the potential of linked social media accounts more
than some other correspondents and routinely tweeted
to promote his television show ‘Peston’ or his recently
published book. The shifting of his television slot to a
Wednesday evening from Sundays was accompanied by
the launch of his own Twitter emoji which appears au-
tomatically when ‘#Peston’ is typed by users. He often
made fun of himself, uploading a video of himself pre-
senting outside No. 10 Downing Street where he repeat-
edly dropped his earpiece. Almost 28% of his tweets pro-
moted either his television programme, his appearances
in news bulletins or linked to his commentaries. In the
period he posted 22 pictures of himself to Twitter.
When it came to the other broadcasters, Sky’s Politi-
cal Editor Faisal Islam engaged mainly in tweeting break-
ing news from politicians and sometimes used multiple,
numbered tweets (up to 10 in a stream)—a thread—to
explore detail on a story. One of the Telegraph correspon-
dents with a reputation for detailed knowledge of Brexit,
Europe Editor Peter Foster3, has developed this further,
posting a 20-tweet thread on talks in a way that allowed
complex analysis. The tone of Islam’s tweets was analyti-
cal and often attempted to contextualise the shifting po-
litical stances around the Brexit debate. He promoted his
own scoop on BMW’s decision to close down its Mini
factory near Oxford for a month after Brexit plus an in-
terview with Theresa May. He retweeted content and a
promotional video for Sophy Ridge on Sunday, his Sky
colleague’s political talk show. He also leveraged Sky’s
name by tweeting programmes or news reports from his
colleagues. In addition, he retweeted a campaign by Sky
News tomake TVdebates a permanent feature ofUK gen-
eral elections. Channel 4’s political editor Gary Gibbon
took the most conservative approach to Twitter, linking
to his blog and footage from the broadcaster’s flagship
7 p.m. news programme. The tweets camewith a full-size
picture, often of Theresa May, and once of himself as a
correspondent standing outside parliament.
The data showed that newspaper journalists tended
to focus on recycling and promoting stories by their own
colleagues or others working in Westminster, support-
ing the assertion by Behr that the Twitter culture can
lead to a collaborative view of events (2018, p. 22). The
Guardian’s joint political editor Heather Stewart was by
far themost active. She tweeted live breaking news from
the weekly parliamentary questions session and from
some of the party conferences. A large proportion of
her activity (31.6%) was made up of tweets or retweets
which either cited her own stories or, in the majority
of cases, featured the work of her colleagues or those
on the sister newspaper The Observer. In one tweet,
Stewart, who attended the Labour Party conference in
Liverpool, wrote:
I am bloody proud to work for the paper that exposed
the Windrush4 scandal, which Jeremy Corbyn spoke
about somovingly in his conference speech yesterday.
Just saying.
Unlike others, she frequently retweeted job adverts,
both within journalism and also at political think tanks
and other similar organisations. The Daily Mail’s political
editor Jason Groves tended to tweet breaking news from
politicians, often drawing on interviews on Britain’s Sun-
day television chat shows, either hosted by the BBC jour-
nalist AndrewMarr or Sky’s Sophy Ridge. Gordon Rayner,
The Telegraph’s political editor, also used Twitter spar-
ingly, sometimes posting breaking news (five tweets as
Theresa May made her conference speech) but more of-
ten tweeting links to Telegraph stories by his colleagues.
In one tweet, he congratulated a colleague at the news-
paper on her front page ‘splash’ on Brexit, saying “Great
work.” Francis Elliott, The Times’ political editor, was also
on the lower end of the activity scale. Some 23.9% of his
activity was in the form of tweets, retweets or links to ar-
ticles by himself or his colleagues on the newspaper; he
sometimes linked to the day’s front page, at one stage
praising its layout. He also promoted his own scoop on
Brexit (and retweeted coverage of it by rivals). Through
links and retweets, he paid tribute to journalists work-
ing in Kabul, showing solidarity with them by linking to a
CNN story that detailed how they are being targeted by
the Taliban. When Behr wrote his scathing article about
how Twitter is poisoning politics, Elliott tweeted: “fwiw5
trying to build Twitter free hours into my day.”
5.4. What Lobby Correspondents Felt about Branding
on Twitter
The lobby correspondents interviewed all felt that
Twitter had become an integral part of their daily prac-
tice, particularly as a news gathering and ‘tip-off’ mecha-
3 Peter Foster is not one of the 10 political correspondents tracked for this research but also works on the mainstream Brexit story.
4 The Guardian broke the story of the UK government’s mistreatment of the so-called ‘Windrush’ immigrants to Britain who had arrived from the
Caribbean in the years after World War Two. Windrush referred to the name of one of the ships that arrived in London from Jamaica in 1948.
5 Fwiw—for what it’s worth.
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nism. They used Tweetdeck6, alongside wire services as
standard. Twitter, said one, is a very good ‘radar screen’
in the competitive environment of the political lobby.
This clearly echoed research which has focused on Twit-
ter’s use as a reporting tool and how it has become a valu-
able ‘beat’ (Broersma & Graham, 2013, p. 447). At the
same time, they were acutely aware of potential pitfalls,
not least the possibility for Twitter in the closed lobby
environment to exacerbate the tendency to form what
Behr calls “cartels of information” (2018, p. 22). One ex-
perienced lobby correspondent said:
It can bring with it a slavery of confirmation bias and
group think and you have to be careful to separate
out the reputable from the disreputable, the polemic
from the fact-based—they all get mixed together into
a sort of sludge.
The correspondents were accepting of the guidelines
drawn up by their editorial managers and felt the re-
lationship with social media had become more relaxed
than when Twitter was new. The “corporate panic” of
the early days had faded, said one. One broadcaster said
the clear rule was nothing should be tweeted that you
wouldn’t say live on air and it made sense to be held to
the same standard. They identified the biggest potential
problem around retweeting third party content, one not-
ing that journalists are being called out all the time for
bias. This trend, he said, had become exacerbated in the
past few years, with some people just wanting to shout
at journalists. Several of the interviewees remarked that
the political parties they report on are closely watching
retweets for any sign of bias.
Several of the journalists interviewed said they felt
under pressure to tweet from their employer. None had
quotas but one suggested this pressuremight explain the
rush of retweets seen each morning, adding there were
increasing expectations that he andhis colleagues should
promote themselves and encourage followers to click
through to underlying stories. When questioned about
how they tweeted, there was a wide spectrum of prac-
tices, from the very cautious to those who enthusias-
tically embraced the opportunity to brand themselves.
One broadcast journalist said it clearly came more nat-
urally to those who worked in television and radio since
they tended in any case “to showmore of themselves on
air.” He added:
I suppose I saw it as a chance to build your brand and
that is a key part of its role…using Twitter is a way of
gaining a visibility…away of getting known by the peo-
ple you want to talk to.
Their techniques varied widely. One said he used a “scat-
tergun” approach, droppingmaterial into his Twitter feed
that he was interested in and he felt his followers might
not otherwise see. All of them linked to longer news sto-
ries and valued the ability to cross promote programmes,
podcasts or panel discussions they or their colleagues
were involved in. Some were happy to tweet informa-
tion about their private lives, arguing it helped build their
identity online and made them human. Others felt it was
better to keep strictly to the political agenda and as such
had a far more conservative approach to brand building.
The practice of live tweeting breaking news also divided
opinion. Some saw it as part of their job and a way of
building their presence; others felt it was not their role
to replicate a news agency. Despite the inherent dan-
gers of Twitter, all those interviewed saw advantages be-
yond newsgathering. They believed a strong online pro-
file would make themmoremarketable for any future ca-
reer move and, for those working on newspapers, Twit-
ter gave some the freedom to distance themselves from
highly partisan and extreme editorial stances over Brexit.
While some of the lobby correspondents were more
comfortable with the idea of branding themselves than
others, all were accepting of it despite having started
their careers in a traditional style of journalism. None felt
they were crossing a line into commercial territory. One
said he saw no ethical dilemma; another said it was nat-
ural given the importance of gaining online traction. One
newspaper journalist thought it was only sensible given
the competitive pressures faced in the news market:
We are all in a war for ears, a war for eyeballs, we are
all trying to make our pieces more attractive and per-
suasive and it is therefore my job. I am not measured
by how many clicks I get but the company is trying to
build subscriptions….I feel it is my job to get people
to look at my stuff and to promote the work of the
paper—that’s what pays my bills.
6. Conclusion
In this age of populism, polarised opinion and fake news,
it comes as no surprise that Twitter should have become
so deeply embedded in Britain’s lobby reporting at West-
minster. It may have started out as another reporting aid,
but it is now an integrated part of the culture and iden-
tity of those who operate in it, accepted as a means of
audience engagement and as a promotional tool.
The first research question (RQ1) asked how political
correspondents brand themselves, their news organisa-
tion and the profession of journalism through Twitter.
The activity of the 10 lobby correspondents followed
showed that they all engage in building their own identity
and brand but to very different degrees and by adopting
different approaches. The broadcasters clearly felt more
comfortable given the fact that they already receive con-
siderable public exposure on air and routinely posted
tweets to promote their own programmes or those of
colleagues. Reflecting that on-air presence, their tweets
often featured pictures of themselves, either prepar-
ing in studios or conducting interviews with politicians.
6 Tweetdeck is a dashboard allowing multiple ‘timelines’ to be monitored at once.
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They were quite willing to make fun of their own on-air
mishaps by using a form of self-deprecating humour, un-
derscoring Molyneux’s findings on the use of humour as
a means of fostering journalists’ relationship with their
audience (2015, p. 932). By contrast, the newspaper jour-
nalists were generally less active and tended to promote
the work of their colleagues. As such, the broadcast-
ers blurred the lines between the professional and per-
sonal far more than the newspaper journalists. All of the
correspondents gave credit to those working in other
organisations if they had a scoop but those journalists
were usually covering the same political story, reinforc-
ing the impression that the lobby is an echo chamber.
exuding a ‘clubby’ atmosphere in which journalists co-
operate closely with each other despite competitive ri-
valries. Twitter allows them to monitor each other’s sto-
ries and at the same time reinforces a conformity in
their output.
All those interviewed were aware of their news or-
ganisation’s code of conduct for social media and were
cautious when retweeting (RQ2). The broadcasters were
also acutely aware of oversight by the regulator Ofcom.
While outside the scope of this article, the analysis of
the 10 Twitter feeds shows that few of the lobby corre-
spondents routinely expressed overt opinions although
some sailed close to the wind and were able to do so
mainly through their retweets. Those who were inter-
viewed recognised the normative professional ideology
of the separation between news and the business of
news but none felt their activity on Twitter undermined
this, illustrating a dissonance between stated values and
actual practice. In effect, their branding activity had be-
come quietly but clearly absorbed within the boundaries
of what is considered to be acceptable journalism and
normalised (RQ3). Despite a stated adherence to norma-
tive ideology, their actual practice bore the hallmarks of
what, in a previous era, might have been called market-
ing. Their links to news stories increased their organisa-
tion’s distribution channels, while their links to program-
ming at times represented a classic promotional activity
that might previously have been carried out by the busi-
ness side of the operation. Therewas a strong suggestion
from those interviewed that it made pragmatic sense to
promote one’s employer given the difficult financial state
of the industry. This would suggest that news organisa-
tions are succeeding in drawing on Twitter as a tool to en-
gage audiences and bolster their business without overt
opposition even from senior journalists. While the dis-
course of normative values of separation remained in-
tact, in practice the lobby correspondents were engaging
in creating, developing andmaintaining their brandwhile
cross promoting that of their colleagues, their news or-
ganisations and, at times, their campaigns. In this envi-
ronment of UK political reporting such branding has be-
come normalised as part of daily journalistic practice and
in this respect the boundary has been quietly breached.
As one broadcast journalist said: “If there is a line I have
crossed, I have not noticed crossing it.”
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